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The	  centuries-­‐long	  history	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  has	  been	  and	  somehow	  still	  is	  considered	  
by	  non-­‐Ottoman	  historians	  from	  a	  teleological	  approach1.	  So	  challenging	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
Middle	  East	  has	  been	   ruled	  by	  an	   independent,	  hegemonic	   State,	   that	   the	  European	  –	  or,	  
better	   to	   say,	   Eurocentric	   –	   culture	   and	   mentality	   need	   to	   keep	   celebrating	   its	   actual	  
historical	  decay	  and	  ultimate	  end.	  The	   institutional	  experience	  of	   the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  still	  
happens	  to	  be	  either	  abused	  or	  sentenced	  to	  a	  damnatio	  memoriae.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  
in	  those	  countries	  that	  are	  directly	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  memory.	  These	  nations,	  such	  
as	  Turkey,	  Italy,	  Greece,	  Bulgaria	  and	  other	  Balkan	  countries,	  also	  happen	  to	  host	  the	  most	  
extensive	   Ottoman	   archives	   in	   the	   world.	   As	   far	   as	   Italian	   historiography	   is	   concerned,	  
Ottoman	   documents	   are	   seldom	   directly	   examined,	   even	   when	   dealing	   with	   the	   ever-­‐
fashionable	   topics	   of	   Mediterranean	   history.	   Leaving	   aside	   the	   deliberately	   overlooked	  
period	  of	  post-­‐unitary	  connections,	  even	  the	  diversified	  relationships	  between	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire	  and	  the	  Ancient	  Italian	  States	  are	  traditionally	  investigated	  using	  sources	  other	  than	  
Ottoman	   documents.	   This,	   I	   believe,	   has	   been	   conducive	   to	   producing	   a	   hesitation	   in	  
historiographical	   advances	   from	   the	   late	   1970s	   onwards.	   Many	   questions	   that	   had	   been	  
posed	  by	  a	  generation	  of	  Italian	  historians,	  deeply	  concerned	  with	  economic	  structures	  and	  
models,	  and	  influenced	  by	  Fernand	  Braudel’s	  perspective,	  have	  been	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  
topics	   that	   have	   more	   to	   do	   with	   methodological	   assumptions	   than	   with	   an	   actual	  
interpretation	  of	  historical	  data2.	  It	  would	  be	  hazardous	  to	  think	  that	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
comparative	  approach,	  alone,	  would	  have	  protected	  Italian	  historiography	   in	  the	  uncertain	  
circumstances	   currently	   affecting	   humanities.	   Nevertheless,	   what	   is	   certain	   is	   that	   the	  
perspective	   offered	   by	   a	   different	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   same	   structures	   and	   events	  
necessarily	  broadens	   the	  horizons	  of	  a	  discipline	  and	  makes	   it	  more	  difficult	   to	  weaken	   its	  
cultural	   significance.	   The	  history	  of	   the	  Mediterranean	  and	  of	   the	  Ancient	   Italian	   States	   is	  
now	  ready	  to	  be	  verified	  via	  Ottoman	  sources,	  in	  all	  their	  wide	  varieties.	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Furthermore,	  the	  actual	  amount	  and	  quality	  of	  Ottoman	  sources	  kept	  in	  Italian	  archives	  is	  far	  
from	   being	   completely	   known.	   In	   the	   State	   Archives	   of	   Palermo,	   for	   example,	   Ottoman	  
documents	  are	  classified	  as	  “unreadable	  Arabic	  documents”,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  memory	  
of	  Ottoman	  interests	  in	  Sicily	  has	  been	  completely	  erased:	  in	  1861,	  six	  Ottoman	  consuls	  were	  
active	  on	  the	  island	  and	  now	  nobody	  there	  is	  able	  to	  read	  their	  documents.	  One	  may	  hold	  
the	  difficulties	  of	  the	  language	  as	  responsible	  for	  the	  non-­‐involvement	  of	  Italian	  scholars	  and	  
historians;	  but	   this	  assumption	  –	  however	   scientifically	  unacceptable	  –	   is	   inexorably	  called	  
into	   question	   by	   the	   deeply-­‐rooted	   tradition	   of	  Ottoman	   studies	   in	   Italy3.	   Another	   reason	  
might	  be	  the	  previous,	   lengthy	   inaccessibility	  of	  Turkish	  archives,	  but	   then	  why	  should	  the	  
perfectly	  accessible	  Ottoman	  documents	  kept	  in	  the	  Italian	  archives	  share	  the	  same	  destiny?	  	  
And	  why	  should	  not	  this	  reason	  be	  null	  and	  void,	  now	  that	  the	  Turkish	  archives	  have	  been	  
opened?	   Rather,	   I	   am	   inclined	   to	   think	   that	   a	   peculiar	   strategy	   of	   State-­‐building	   is	   at	   the	  
basis	  of	  this	  “repression”:	  after	  1876,	  the	  new	  Italian	  ruling	  class	   let	  colonialism	  transmit	  a	  
new	  ideology	  of	  consent.	  Post-­‐Garibaldi	  discourses	  on	  the	  pretended	  “Italianness”	  of	  Albania	  
started	  to	  fill	  up	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  national	  press,	  the	  Corriere	  della	  Sera	  printing	  among	  the	  
most	  chauvinist	  anti-­‐Ottoman	  prose.	  	  
Now	  that	  the	  not-­‐too-­‐glorious	  age	  of	  Italian	  social-­‐colonialism4	  is	  only	  a	  distant	  memory,	  our	  
historical	  tradition	  seems	  still	  gratuitously	  bound	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  storia	  patria	  needs	  to	  
be	  based	  on	  “native”	  sources,	  relegating	  Ottoman	  and,	  in	  general,	  foreign	  records	  to	  being	  a	  
curiosity	   for	   philologists,	   if	   not	   a	   rarity	   for	   antiquarians.	   Will	   a	   department	   of	  
comparative/world	  history	  ever	  be	   founded	   in	   Italy?	   It	   seems	  perhaps	  more	  appropriate	  –	  
however	  provocative	  –	  to	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  the	  interest	  shown	  in	  the	  last	  few	  months	  by	  the	  
Italian	   industries	   in	   the	   Turkish	   economic	   boom	   and	   to	   claim	   that	   at	   least	   this	   renewed	  
commercial	  vocation	  eastwards	  will	  demand	  and	  produce	  an	  innovative	  cultural	  and	  political	  
base	  for	  its	  development.	  
	  
The	  eastwards	   trend	   in	   international	   trade	  has	  been	   considered	  a	   structural	   aspect	   in	   the	  
history	   of	   the	   Italian	   peninsula5.	   The	   governments	   held	   by	   the	   destra	   storica	   were	   fully	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aware	   of	   its	   original	   character	   and	   kept	   encouraging	   it	   by	   building	   infrastructures	   in	   the	  
country	  and	  by	  demanding	  high	  performances	  from	  Italian	  diplomacy	  abroad	  and	  especially	  
in	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire6.	   The	   close,	   substantial	   connection	   between	   trade,	   peace	   and	  
diplomacy	   is	  maybe	   the	  Republic	  of	  Venice’s	  most	  precious	  bequest	   to	   the	  modern	   Italian	  
State.	   A	   “quintessentially	   neutral”	   power,	   its	   ruling	   class	   constantly	   acted	   as	   a	   conflict-­‐
defusing	   factor	   in	   16th	   century	   Mediterranean	   affairs7.	   As	   we	   shall	   see,	   this	   pattern	  
continued	  with	  even	  more	   intensity	   throughout	   the	   first	  decades	  of	   the	   following	  century,	  
from	  the	  (propitious)	  abandonment	  of	  the	  Holy	  League	  (1573)	  till	  the	  War	  of	  Candia	  (1645).	  
Venice	  was	  still	  among	  the	  leading	  industrial	  powers	  of	  the	  time	  and	  trade	  with	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire	   was	   vital	   to	   the	   very	   existence	   of	   the	   State.	   Nevertheless,	   after	   the	   Ottoman	  
conquest	  of	  Cyprus,	  Venetian	   interests	   in	   the	  Eastern	  Mediterranean	  were	  destined	   to	  be	  
seriously	   compromised.	   The	   loss	   of	   such	   an	   important	   base	   for	   their	   feudal	   business	  
economy	  would	  have	  soon	  deprived	  the	  Venetian	  merchants	  of	  their	  privileged	  position	   in	  
the	  commercial	  competition	  of	  the	  time.	  True,	  the	  Venetian	  network	  in	  Syria	  was	  so	  deeply	  
rooted	   that	   the	   relatively	   short	   war	   in	   Cyprus	   did	   not	   have	   an	   immediate	   effect	   on	   the	  
commercial	   competition	   in	   the	   area:	   throughout	   the	   subsequent	   two	   decades,	   the	  
merchants	  of	  Saint	  Mark’s	  continued	  to	  be	  the	  most	  influential	  and	  numerous	  trading	  nation	  
in	   Aleppo.	   Nevertheless,	   this	   inertia	   was	   destined	   to	   end.	   Moreover,	   and	   partially	   in	  
consequence	  of	  these	  late-­‐16th-­‐century	  events,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  17th	  century	  the	  first	  
crisis	  of	  production	  occurred	  in	  all	  its	  dramatic	  evidence8.	  	  
	  
The	  crisis	  of	  the	  17th	  century	  is	  considered	  a	  “general”	  crisis9.	  This	  means	  that	  its	  causes	  and	  
effects	   are	   traceable	   in	   many	   aspects	   of	   the	   economic	   life	   of	   the	   time:	   demographic,	  
industrial	  and	  commercial.	  Some	  historians	  prefer	  to	  stress	  its	  “structural”	  pattern,	  pointing	  
out	   the	   irreversible	   failure	  of	  a	  whole	  model	  of	  development10.	  The	  English	  and	  the	  Dutch	  
not	  only	  won	  the	  competition	  with	  the	  former	  leading	  economies	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Italians”	  –	  
but	  also	  laid	  the	  foundations	  of	  a	  completely	  innovative	  deal	  in	  the	  economic	  history	  of	  the	  
world.	  This	  process	  was	  neither	  quick	  nor	  sudden.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  throughout	  the	  second	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half	   of	   the	   preceding	   century	   the	   English	   had	   slowly	   proceeded	   towards	   what	   has	   been	  
called	  “the	  unmaking	  of	  Venetian	  hegemony”	  in	  Mediterranean	  trade11.	  Their	  first	  and	  most	  
effective	   weapon	   had	   been	   to	   counterfeit	   Venetian	   fabrics.	   Lower-­‐quality	   and	   cheap	  
imitations	   of	   Venetian	   textiles	  were	   introduced	   into	   the	   Levantine	  markets	   and	   circulated	  
with	  the	  fake	  brand	  of	  the	  lion	  of	  Saint	  Mark’s.	  This	  strategy	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  jump	  in	  
the	  industrial	  system	  of	  textile	  production,	  supported	  –	  as	  argued	  by	  the	  energy	  economists	  
–	  by	  mineral	  energy	  resources:	  coal	  and	  turf	  instead	  of	  wood12.	  Consequently,	  lower	  costs	  of	  
production,	  together	  with	  daring	  choices	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  colors	  and	  materials,	  had	  the	  effect	  
of	  expanding	  the	  market.	  More	  people	  had	  access	  to	  cheaper	  products.	  This	  did	  not	  mean	  
that	  Venetian	  fabrics	  were	  about	  to	  disappear:	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Sultan	  and	  the	  Ottoman	  
élite	   would	   continue	   to	   favor	   Venetian	   luxury	   items	   throughout	   the	   existence	   of	   the	  
Republic.	  What	  changed	  was	  the	  system	  of	  consumption	  on	  a	  wider	  scale13.	  The	  Dutch	  and	  
English	  merchants	  were	  paying	  for	  raw	  materials	  such	  as	  cotton	  and	  wool	  with	  (smuggled)14	  
American	  silver,	  partially	  recovered	  through	  the	  sale	  of	   the	  end	  products	  of	   their	   industry.	  
This	  mercantilist	   scheme	   of	   proto-­‐colonial	   penetration	   kept	   the	  Mediterranean	   –	   and	   the	  
Ottoman	   Empire,	  more	   than	   any	   other	   State	   –	   at	   the	   center	   of	   the	  world’s	   interests.	   The	  
Mediterranean	   lands	  were	   at	   the	   same	   time	  a	   space	  where	   raw	  materials	  were	  produced	  
and	   a	   promising,	   socially	   diversified	   community	   of	   consumption.	   Varied	   strategies	   were	  
adopted	  in	  order	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  different	  social	  and	  institutional	  realities	  that	  came	  into	  
contact	   with	   this	   new	   economy15.	   In	   Southern	   Italy,	   for	   example,	   the	   English	   merchants	  
substituted	   the	   Venetian	   and	   Genoese	   network	   by	   developing	   a	   pattern	   of	   intervention	  
focusing	  on	  re-­‐exports16.	  In	  general,	  English	  trade	  in	  Italy	  was	  mainly	  a	  transit	  trade,	  Livorno	  
being	  an	  indispensable	  stopping-­‐off	  point	  on	  the	  route	  taken	  by	  English	  ships	  sailing	  to	  the	  
Mediterranean17.	   In	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire,	   too,	   strategies	   are	   difficult	   to	   generalize	   to	   a	  
common	  pattern,	  each	  provincial	  situation	  –	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  the	  capital18	  –	  needing	  a	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Rapp,	  1975.	  
12	  Wrigley,	  2010.	  
13	  Braudel,	  1974;	  Carmagnani,	  2010;	  Parker,	  2001	  and	  Pamuk,	  2000.	  
14	  Moutoukias,	  1988.	  	  
15	  Pagano	  de	  Divitiis,	  1997.	  
16	  Ibidem.	  
17	  Braudel	  and	  Romano,	  1951;	  Ghezzi,	  2007;	  D’Angelo,	  2004	  and	  Pagano	  de	  Divitiis,	  1997.	  
18	  Eldem,	  Goffman	  and	  Masters,	  2003	  and	  Mantran,	  1996.	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detailed	   inspection19.	   Nevertheless,	   all	   these	   places	   had	   to	   cope	   with	   a	   new	  mercantilist	  
approach	   in	   the	   commercial	   transactions	   and	   ultimately	   happened	   to	   suffer	   from	   it	  while	  
finding	   their	   place	   within	   modernity20.	   Indeed,	   the	   crisis	   of	   the	   17th	   century	   introduced	  
structural	   elements	   of	   inequality	   and	   disharmony	   among	   trading	   regions.	   Even	   today’s	  
disparity	   between	  Northern	   and	   Southern	   European	   countries	   needs	   to	   be	   traced	  back	   to	  
the	   17th	   century	   in	   order	   to	   be	   properly	   understood21.	   Now,	  what	  was	   the	   impact	   of	   this	  
crisis	  on	  the	  economic	  policies	  of	  the	  period?	  Did	  the	  former	  leading	  economies	  react?	  It	  has	  
been	  written	   that	   the	  Question	  d’Orient	   cannot	  be	  examined	  without	  also	   considering	   the	  
answers	  provided	  to	  that	  question	  by	  the	  Orient(s)	  it(them)self(-­‐ves)22.	  Did	  the	  “old	  world”23	  
think	  about	  an	  alternative	  path	  towards	  the	  age	  of	  mercantilism24?	  	  
	  
Though	  structural,	   the	  crisis	  has	  been	  described	  as	   relative	  and	  not	  absolute,	  as	   far	  as	   the	  
city	  of	  Venice	  was	  concerned25.	  Mechanisms	  of	  old-­‐regime	  social	  security	  –	  such	  as	  the	  guild	  
system	   –	   prevented	   living	   standards	   from	   lowering,	   the	   highest	   price	   of	   the	   crisis	   being	  
ultimately	  paid	  by	  the	  countryside,	  through	  re-­‐feudalization	  methods.	  This	  pattern	  had	  the	  
effect	  of	  protecting	  the	  industrial	  sector	  and,	  on	  a	  different	  though	  interlinking	  level,	  made	  it	  
possible	   for	   the	   Republican	   ruling	   class	   to	   establish	   autonomous	   priorities	   in	   the	   State’s	  
economic	  policies.	  If	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  crisis	  has	  to	  be	  looked	  for,	  it	  must	  be	  in	  the	  Venetian	  
commercial	   affairs.	   In	   1577,	   a	   Jewish	   merchant	   named	   Daniel	   Rodriga	   presented	   to	   the	  
Senate	  of	  the	  Republic	  a	  project	  of	  establishing	  an	  international	  port	  in	  the	  Dalmatian	  city	  of	  
Spalato,	   formally	   part	   of	   the	   Venetian	   stato	   da	   mar26.	   The	   proposal	   was	   taken	   into	  
consideration	   and	   accepted	   by	   the	   authorities.	   Basically,	   Rodriga’s	   project	  was	   to	   apply	   a	  
low-­‐custom	  policy	   in	   order	   to	   attract	  Ottoman	   goods	   to	   Spalato	   rather	   than	   to	   any	   other	  
Eastern	   Adriatic	   port.	   Spalato	   being	   a	   Venetian	   colony,	   the	   ships	   would	   have	   then	   left	  
compulsorily	  for	  the	  Serenissima.	  As	  the	  Levant	  Company	  had	  its	  Livorno,	  Venice	  could	  count	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Hanna,	  1998;	  Khouri,	  1997;	  Goffman,	  1990;	  Frangakis-­‐Syrett,	  1992;	  Smyrnelis,	  1999	  and	  Faroqhi,	  2006.	  
20	  Masters,	  1988.	  
21	  Romano,	  1993.	  
22	  Georgeon,	  1989.	  
23	  Lanaro,	  2006.	  
24	  “[S]i	  sbaglierebbe	  a	  concludere	  […]	  che	  Venezia	  assistette	  inerte	  a	  questo	  declassamento	  di	  una	  marina	  
mercantile	  che	  per	  secoli	  era	  stata	  il	  suo	  vanto”	  (Sella,	  1961	  and	  1994).	  
25	  Rapp,	  1976.	  
26	  Paci,	  1971.	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on	   its	   Spalato.	   As	   a	   satellite	   free	   port,	   the	   Dalmatian	   city	   could	   become	   Venice’s	   feudal	  
“subterfuge”	  to	  the	  new	  economy.	  One	  only	  has	  to	   look	  at	  a	  map	  to	  understand	  how	  slim	  
the	   portion	   of	   Venetian	   territory	   was	   on	   the	   Dalmatian	   coast.	   Immediately	   beyond	   the	  
border,	   began	   the	   boundless	   paese	   turchesco.	   The	   project	   of	   the	   scala	   di	   Spalato	   had	   to	  
count	  on	  the	  organic	  cooperation	  of	  the	  Ottomans	  or	  it	  could	  not	  exist.	  	  
It	   has	   been	  written	   that	   economic	   history	   has	   its	   own	   chronology,	   independent	   from	   the	  
traditional	  partition	  of	  human	  history27.	  Quite	  similarly,	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  has	  its	  own	  
space	  too,	  equally	   independent	   from	  the	  geography	  drawn	  by	   institutional	  borders.	   In	   this	  
sense,	   Early-­‐Modern	   Venetian	  Dalmatia	   and	  Ottoman	   Bosnia	  were	   a	   concrete	   example	   of	  
geographic	   contiguity	   and	   economic	   interdependence.	   There	   were	   towns	   under	   Ottoman	  
rule,	  their	  natural	  port	  (“marina”)	  being	  beyond	  the	  border,	  in	  Venetian	  territory.	  Such	  was	  
the	   case	   of	   Venetian	   Spalato	   (İsplit)	   and	   Ottoman	   Kilis	   (Clissa).	   The	   more	   critical	   and	  
controversial	  the	  Balkan	  border	  became	  during	  the	  wars,	  the	  less	  intense	  it	  became	  during	  
the	   longer	  periods	  of	  peace.	  A	  pervasive	  phenomenon	  of	  professional	   cross-­‐migration	  had	  
already	   been	   denounced	   on	   many	   occasions	   by	   Qānūnī	   Süleymān	   (mid-­‐16th	   century):	  
immediately	  before	  a	  military	  campaign	  against	  Persia,	  the	  Sultan	  had	  to	  repeat	  his	  orders	  of	  
salt	   for	   the	   army,	   since	   all	   of	   it	  was	   already	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	  Venetian	  merchants,	   the	  
Ottoman	  salt-­‐works	  being	  monopolized	  by	  their	  network28.	  The	  situation	  might	  be	  described	  
in	   terms	   of	   economic	   pervasiveness	   of	   the	   city-­‐State	   of	   Venice	   towards	   the	   Ottoman	  
periphery.	   The	   current	   oblivion	   of	   Early-­‐Modern	   history	   makes	   everybody	   remember	  
Ottoman	   Bosnia	   as	   a	   province	   far	   from	   its	   political	   center,	   economically	   depressed	   and	  
deeply	   harassed	   by	   ethnic	   disputes	   and	   colonial	   interests.	   This	   is	  mainly	   due	   to	   the	   19th-­‐
century	   and	   current	   events	   concerning	   this	   area,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   post-­‐Fascist	   voluntary	  
oblivion	  of	  Venice’s	  maritime	  power	  on	  the	  Eastern	  coast	  of	  the	  Adriatic.	  Moreover,	  it	  should	  
also	   be	   remembered	   that	   Ottoman	   Bosnia	   corresponded	   to	   the	   western,	   farthest	  
ramification	  of	  a	  trade	  route	  whose	  cohesion	  was	  augmented	  by	  the	  unity	  of	  Ottoman	  rule.	  
How	  this	  unity	  contributed	  to	  delaying	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  economic	  crisis	  has	  not	  been	  
investigated	   yet29.	  What	   emerges	   from	   the	   documents	   is	   that	   a	   whole	   stream	   of	   Eastern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Romano,	  1976.	  
28	  Gökbilgin,	  1964	  and	  Hocquet,	  1979.	  
29	  Barkan,	  1961.	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products,	  including	  for	  example	  Indian	  pepper,	  arrived	  in	  Bosnia	  by	  caravan30.	  Together	  with	  
local	  products,	   such	  as	  wool,	  wax,	  cheese,	   thickfelt,	   silk	  and	  semi-­‐processed	   leather,	   these	  
goods	  all	   reached	  Saray	  Bosna	  and	  then	  took	  different	   routes	   to	   reach	   the	  maritime	  coast	  
westwards.	  Dubrovnik,	  Narenta,	  Maqarsqa,	  Şebenik,	  Leş	  and	  Nova	  were	  the	  major	  accesses	  
to	  the	  sea.	  The	  Venetian	  project	  of	  letting	  the	  Balkan	  merchandise	  converge	  in	  Kilis	  and	  then	  
Spalato	   was	   an	   attempt	   to	   clamp	   down	   on	   this	   fragmentation,	   preserving	   the	   cohesive	  
nature	  of	  trade	  granted	  by	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  lands.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  territory	  ruled	  
by	  the	  Venetians	  played	  its	  traditional	  role	  of	  “natural”	  continuation	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  lands.	  
Many	   authoritative	  words	   have	   been	  written	   about	   the	   compatibility	   of	   the	   two	   States31.	  
The	  project	  of	  the	  scala	  di	  Spalato	  may	  very	  well	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  extreme	  declination	  of	  
this	  compatibility.	  
	  
The	  realization	  of	  the	  project	  could	  count	  on	  an	  already	  well-­‐established	  Venetian	  network	  
in	  the	  area.	  A	  Conte	  was	  in	  charge	  in	  the	  port	  of	  Spalato	  and	  another	  was	  in	  the	  nearby	  city	  
of	   Zara,	   both	   submitting	   to	   a	  Provveditore	  Generale	   di	  Dalmazia,	   also	   established	   in	   Zara.	  
These	  three	  public	  offices	  were	  assigned	  to	  patricians	  for	  three	  years.	  Moreover,	  just	  across	  
the	  nearby	  Ottoman	  border,	  a	  Venetian	  consul	  –	  not	  necessarily	  a	  patrician	  –	  was	  appointed	  
both	   in	   Kilis	   and	   in	   Saray	   Bosna,	   nowadays	   Sarajevo	   (Daniel	   Rodriga,	   for	   example,	  was	   in	  
charge	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   16th	   century).	   This	   institutional	   network,	   reaching	   deep	   into	   the	  
Ottoman	  domains,	  was	  somehow	  the	  demonstration	  of	  the	  vitality	  of	  Venetian	  interests	   in	  
the	   Balkans	   even	   before	   the	   actual	   establishment	   of	   the	   Scala.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	   16th	  
century,	   the	   target	   became	   that	   of	   activating	   this	   network	   towards	   a	   new	   perspective:	  
allowing	  the	  route	  from	  Saray	  Bosna	  to	  Kilis,	  to	  Spalato,	  and	  ultimately	  to	  Venice,	  to	  become	  
the	   preferential	   path	   for	   traded	   goods	   travelling	   westwards.	   In	   view	   of	   this	   target,	   the	  
aforementioned	  network	  was	   integrated	  by	  other,	  not-­‐necessarily	   institutionalized,	   figures	  
with	  the	  task	  of	  facilitating	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Ottoman	  authorities	  established	  in	  Skopije,	  
Sofia,	   and	   Saray	   Bosna,	   and	   with	   the	   merchants	   at	   all	   levels:	   “[…]	   vi	   commettemo	   che	  
dobbiate	  immediate	  mandar	  quelle	  persone	  che	  voi	  stimarete	  buone	  per	  condur	  a	  fine	  questo	  
negozio,	  facendolo	  trattar	  con	  quella	  circonspettione	  che	  dalli	  savii	  nostri	  sopra	  la	  mercantia	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  BOA,	  MD	  24,	  hüküm	  43,	  16/Za/981.	  
31	  Braudel,	  1972-­‐73.	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vi	  è	  stata	  scritta,	  […]	  non	  interversando	  in	  ciò	  il	  nome	  pubblico,	  ma	  solamente	  il	  beneficio	  di	  
quei	   sanzacadi	  et	  de	  mercanti	   […]”32,	   the	  Cinque	  Savi	  alla	  Mercanzia	  wrote	   in	  1588	   to	   the	  
Rettori	  di	  Zara.	  
As	  is	  suggested	  by	  this	  quotation,	  at	  this	  stage	  the	  Venetian	  ruling	  class	  chose	  to	  keep	  a	  low	  
international	   profile	   on	   the	   project.	   The	   keyword	   was	   indeed	   circonspettione.	   Venetians	  
were	  particularly	  careful	  not	  to	  let	  the	  project	  become	  an	  international	  affair.	  After	  the	  loss	  
of	  Cyprus	  –	  or,	  according	  to	  traditional	  chronological	  partition,	  after	  the	  Battle	  of	  Lepanto	  –	  
Venice	   is	   relegated	  by	  historiography	   to	   a	   role	   of	   “regional	   power”.	  Was	   it	   really	   so?	   Yes,	  
would	   answer	   in	   reassuring	   tones	   the	   Venetian	   ruling	   class	   of	   the	   day,	   about	  whose	   rare	  
pragmatism	   many	   illuminating	   words	   have	   already	   been	   written33.	   On	   the	   contrary,	  
Venetians	  were	  playing	  their	  cards	  on	  a	  regional	  base,	  in	  order	  to	  re-­‐assess	  their	  hegemony	  
on	   the	   contended	   transit	   trade	  of	   their	  Gulf,	   as	   the	  Adriatic	   Sea	  was	   called	   in	   those	  days.	  
Who	  were	  the	  competitors	  and	  who	  the	  potential	  enemies?	  As	  stated	  by	  the	  Cinque	  Savi	  in	  a	  
paper	  dated	  June	  1589,	  “[n]oi,	  presa	  informazione	  particolare	  et	  dal	  clarissimo	  messer	  Nicolò	  
Bragadino,	   ultimamente	   ritornato	   di	   là,	   et	   da	   Daniel	   Rodriga,	   crediamo	   che	   i	   dubii	  
dell’effettuarla	  si	  risolvono	  in	  dua	  molto	  principali,	  l’uno	  sopra	  le	  difficoltà	  che	  potranno	  esser	  
poste	   dall’emino	   di	   Narenta	   et	   dal	   Sanzaco	   del	   Ducado,	   interessati	   molto	   per	   questa	  
deliberazione,	  quello	  come	  datiaro	  di	  quella	  scala	  et	  questo	  come	  patrone	  del	  paese	  per	  dove	  
convengono	  passar	   hora	   tutte	   le	  mercantie,	   le	   quali	  mutando	   scala	   converranno	   tralasciar	  
quel	  camino	  con	  interesse	  di	  quel	  sanzacado.	  L’altra	  dubietà	  nasce	  dal	  timore	  che	  hanno	  tutti	  
i	  mercanti	  per	   il	  pericolo	  del	  viaggio,	  potendo	   in	  molti	   luoghi	  del	  paese,	  per	   l’abondanza	  di	  
boschi	   et	   altri	   siti	   esser	   assaliti	   et	   da	  Uscocchi	   et	   da	   altri	   […]”34.	   The	  Ottoman	   authorities	  
mentioned	   by	   the	   document	   occupied	   different	   positions	   in	   the	   local	   administration.	   The	  
first	  –	  the	  emin	  of	  the	  port	  town	  of	  Narenta	  –	  was	  the	  person	  to	  whom	  customs	  duties	  were	  
entrusted,	  either	  in	  exchange	  of	  a	  salary	  or,	  more	  often	  in	  this	  area,	  of	  a	  share	  of	  the	  income	  
(iltizām).	   The	   second	   was	   the	   sancaqbeýi	   of	   Duka,	   an	   administrative	   figure	   of	   middling	  
importance,	   also	  appointed	  by	   the	  Sultan,	  who	  mediated	  between	   local	  demands	  and	   the	  
beýlerbeýi.	  The	  two	  of	  them	  nourished	  a	  direct	  or	   indirect	   interest	   in	  trade.	  Of	  course,	  the	  
passage	   of	   a	   caravan	   through	   a	   city	   meant	   dependable	   sources	   of	   income	   under	   many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  ASV,	  Cinque	  Savi	  alla	  Mercanzia,	  I	  serie,	  b.	  162,	  September	  27th	  1588.	  
33	  Arbel,	  1989.	  
34	  ASV,	  Cinque	  Savi	  alla	  Mercanzia,	  I	  serie,	  b.	  162,	  June	  16th	  1589.	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aspects35;	  therefore,	   it	  was	  not	  even	  necessary	  for	  the	  political	  authorities	  to	  have	  a	  direct	  
interest	  in	  the	  goods	  actually	  traded	  –	  which,	  in	  many	  cases,	  they	  had	  –	  in	  order	  to	  intervene	  
in	   favor	   of	   one	   route	   or	   another.	   These	   two	   figures	   were	   neither	   the	   only	   nor	   the	  most	  
dangerous	   competitors	   of	   the	   newly	   established	   scala	   di	   Spalato.	   True,	   their	   bases	   were	  
closer	  to	  Spalato	  than	  any	  other	  port-­‐town	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  latter	  would	  have	  deprived	  
them	  of	  flow	  of	  international	  goods.	  According	  to	  the	  Cinque	  Savi,	  both	  of	  them	  were	  to	  be	  
easily	   neutralized	   through	   the	   well-­‐known	   strategy	   of	   the	   negotio,	   which	   in	   this	   case	  
consisted	  of	  obtaining	  the	  support	  of	  a	  higher	  placed	  authority	  (the	  beýlerbeýi	  of	  Bosnia)	  and	  
other	  local	  figures,	  playing	  on	  the	  rivalries	  between	  the	  servants	  of	  the	  Sultan.	  This	  strategy,	  
which	   modern	   culture	   would	   classify	   as	   political	   or	   diplomatic,	   was	   on	   the	   contrary	  
essentially	  organic	  to	  trade,	  this	  last	  being	  an	  activity	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  we	  may	  assume	  
today.	   The	   Ottoman	   functionaries	   often	   embraced	   the	   Venetian	   cause	   out	   of	   financial	  
interest,	  a	  share	  of	  the	  potential	  income	  being	  destined	  directly	  to	  them.	  
Merchants	   from	   Ancona	   and	   from	   Dubrovnik,	   whose	   fortunes	   were	   subject	   to	   a	   sudden	  
increase	   whenever	   a	  military	   controversy	   would	   pitch	   the	   Republic	   of	   Venice	   against	   the	  
Ottoman	  Empire,	  were	  to	  be	  particularly	  annoyed	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  international	  
port	   in	   Spalato.	   For	   sure,	   their	   opposition	   would	   have	   been	   more	   challenging	   than	   any	  
other’s	  for	  the	  Venetians,	  since	  both	  of	  these	  cities	  could	  have	  turned	  to	  the	  Pope	  and	  asked	  
for	  support.	  The	  Venetians	  were	  certainly	  unwilling	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  direct	  intervention	  of	  the	  
Pope	  in	  economic	  affairs	  concerning	  the	  Gulf36.	  Moreover,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  16th	  century	  –	  as	  
in	  many	  other	  periods	  –	  the	  Pope’s	  intervention	  would	  have	  been	  immediately	  supported	  by	  
the	  King	  of	  Spain,	  both	  of	  them	  being	  affronted	  since	  the	  Venetian	  abandonment	  of	  the	  Holy	  
League.	  In	  other	  words,	  better	  to	  pass	  for	  an	  undervalued	  regional	  power	  rather	  than	  to	  put	  
up	  with	   religiously	  disguised	  political	   interference37.	  Moreover,	  both	  Spain	  and	   the	  Papacy	  
could	  easily	  count	  on	  a	  third,	  promising	  ally	  in	  their	  fight	  for	  hegemony	  in	  the	  Adriatic:	  the	  
Austrian	  monarchy	  was	  taking	  its	  first	  steps	  towards	  the	  Balkans,	  the	  Uskok	  piracy	  being	  its	  
(irregular)	   maritime	   force38.	   Almost	   two	   centuries	   later,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   18th	   century,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  BOA,	  MAD	  706,	  3/C/986.	  
36	  Sarpi,	  1685.	  
37	  Cessi,	  1943.	  
38	  Bracewell,	  1992.	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Trieste	   would	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   the	   long-­‐lasting	   and	   unquestioned	   winner	   in	   the	   Adriatic	  
competition39.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Though	   inscribed	   in	   the	   same	   context,	   the	   auspicated	   circonspettione	   mentioned	   by	   the	  
Cinque	   Savi	   was	  mentioned	   rather	   as	   regards	   to	   the	   central	   government	   of	   the	   Ottoman	  
Empire.	  In	  this	  first	  stage,	  neither	  the	  Sultan	  nor	  the	  Grand	  Vizier	  were	  to	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  
project.	  This	  strategy	  is	  openly	  described	  in	  Venetian	  sources,	  but	  may	  also	  be	  discernible	  in	  
the	  Ottoman	  accounts	  of	   the	   time.	  Often,	   the	  Venetians	   instructed	   the	  beý	   of	   Kilis	   –	   and,	  
through	  his	  mediation,	  the	  beýlerbeýi	  of	  Saray	  Bosna	  –	  to	  realize	  infrastructures	  destined	  to	  
facilitate	   the	   passage	   of	   caravans.	  Whether	   it	   was	   a	   bridge	   that	   needed	   to	   be	   built,	   or	   a	  
forest	  to	  be	  cleared,	  in	  order	  to	  flush	  out	  the	  innumerable	  bandits,	  the	  Venetians	  informed	  
the	  Ottoman	  authorities	  and	  asked	  for	  prompt	   intervention.	   In	  some	  cases,	  the	  tasks	  were	  
accomplished	   by	   the	   local	   administration,	   although	   an	   intervention	   from	   Istanbul	   was	  
frequently	   required,	   especially	   when	   permanent	   infrastructures,	   such	   as	   bridges	   or	  
caravanserais,	   were	   planned.	   Should	   such	   circumstances	   occur,	   the	   local	   authorities	  
informed	  first	  the	  Venetians	  of	  the	  necessity	  to	  contact	  the	  central	  government.	  At	  this	  first	  
stage,	  the	  Cinque	  Savi	  would	  rather	  spend	  money	  out	  of	  the	  Republic’s	  Treasury,	  than	  have	  
the	  Sultan	  solicited	  on	  a	  project	  that	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  kept	  under	  wraps.	  In	  1589,	  the	  Cinque	  
Savi	  wrote:	  “[m]a	  perché	  conviene	  per	  comodo	  delle	  mercantie	  et	  caravane	  ottener	  che	  nel	  
paese	  turchesco,	  sopra	   il	   fiume	  della	  Citina	   lontano	  da	  Spalato	  meza	  giornata,	  sii	  da	  Turchi	  
fabricato	  un	  ponte	  et	  havendo	  di	  ciò	  trattato	   il	  Rodriga,	  come	  egli	  asserisse,	  che	   il	  sanzaco	  
suddetto,	   dal	   quale	   ha	   avuto	   per	   risposta	   che	   non	   vi	   porrà	   mano	   senza	   espresso	  
comandamento	   della	   Porta,	   sarà	   necessario	   procurar	   in	   questo,	   mentre	   che	   nel	   fiume	  
suddetto	  siino	  posti	  doi	  ponti	  sopra	  burchielle	  secondo	  l’uso	  d’Italia,	  perché	  comodamente	  et	  
con	  prestezza	  passino	  le	  mercantie	  et	  caravane.	  A	  qual	  cosa,	  come	  crediamo	  che	  sarà	  facile	  
ottenere,	   renderà	   anco	   minor	   pregiudizio	   alle	   cose	   pubbliche	   per	   quei	   rispetti	   che	   sono	  
considerabili	  molto	  in	  questo	  proposito.”40	  After	  all,	  the	  heavy	  customs	  duty	  of	  the	  mezi	  noli,	  
affecting	   the	   ships	   traveling	   to	   and	   from	   the	   rival	   ports	   of	   Narenta	   and	   Dubrovnik,	   was	  
destined	  to	  cover	  the	  expenses	  needed	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  lazaret	  and	  of	  any	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Tucci,	  1980.	  
40	  ASV,	  Cinque	  Savi	  alla	  Mercanzia,	  I	  serie,	  b.	  162,	  16th	  1589.	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infrastructure	   required	   for	   the	   full	   completion	   of	   the	   route	   (the	   customs	   house,	   bridges,	  
watchtowers	  etc.).	  The	  lazaret	  itself	  was	  of	  prime	  importance	  in	  the	  Venetian	  strategy:	  the	  
strict	   sanitary	   measures	   adopted	   by	   the	   Serenissima	   not	   only	   served	   the	   purpose	   of	  
preventing	   dangerous	   epidemics,	   but	   also	   allowed	   the	   authorities	   to	   let	   personal	  
interpretations	  of	  those	  very	  measures	  become	  the	  rule.	  Ragusean	  ships	  were	  captured	  and	  
dragged	   into	   the	   lazaret	   for	  exasperating	  quarantines	   in	  order	   to	  delay	   the	  delivery	  of	   the	  
goods	  they	  transported41.	  
	  
The	  project	  of	   the	   scala	  di	   Spalato	  was	   indeed	  at	   the	   center	  of	  Venetian	   trade	  politics	  up	  
until	   the	  War	   of	   Candia.	   Together	   with	   the	   relatively	   good	   performance	   of	   the	   industrial	  
sector,	  the	  stubborn	  defense	  of	  the	  Spalato	  route	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  one	  of	  the	  measures	  
that	  made	   the	   decline	   of	   the	   17th-­‐century	   relative	   and	   not	   absolute	   as	   far	   as	   urban	   living	  
standards	  were	   concerned.	  Venetian	   fabrics	   kept	   circulating	   in	   the	  market	  places	  of	   Sofia,	  
Skopije	   and	   Saray	   Bosna	   for	  much	   longer	   than	   in	   the	   new	   and	   old	   trading	   centers	   of	   the	  
Middle	  East,	  such	  as	  Aleppo,	  İzmir	  and	  Cairo,	  where	  the	  competition	  of	  the	  Northerners	  had	  
been	  more	   successful.	   This	   interpretation	   tells	   us	   a	   lot	   about	   the	   capacities	   of	   a	   State	   to	  
influence	  the	  economic	  vicissitudes	  interfering	  with	  the	  life	  and	  means	  of	  its	  people.	  
The	   firm	   intention	   to	   avoid	   the	   direct	   involvement	   of	   the	   Sultan	   in	   this	   first	   stage	   is	  
confirmed	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  sources.	  The	  Sultan’s	  letters	  to	  his	  representatives	  in	  Bosnia	  dealt	  
with	   all	   topics	  but	   the	   scala	  di	   Spalato.	  Nevertheless,	   in	   some	   cases,	   the	   Sultan	  ended	  up	  
legislating	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  scala	  without	  actually	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  wrong	  he	  was	  doing	  to	  
his	  authorities	  in	  Narenta	  or	  to	  his	  tributary	  vassals	  the	  Raguseans.	  	  
These	  circumstances	  did	  not	  last	  more	  than	  twelve	  years.	  Very	  soon,	  the	  competition	  in	  the	  
Adriatic	  became	  so	  bitter	  that	  an	  actual	  alliance	  between	  Venice	  and	  Istanbul	  was	  required	  
in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  route	  leading	  to	  and	  from	  Spalato.	  The	  scala	  had	  become	  the	  symbol	  
of	   Venice’s	   independence	   and	   was	   supported	   by	   a	   strong	   political	   project,	   powered	   and	  
argued	   for	   by	   such	   refined	   intellectuals	   as	   Paolo	   Sarpi.	   Sarpi	   challenged	   Grotius’s	  Mare	  
Liberum	  on	  a	  conceptual	  basis	  and	  offered	  theoretical	  support	  to	  the	  Venetian	  sovereignty	  
on	  the	  Adriatic42.	  An	  undisputed	  protagonist	  of	  the	  period	  of	  the	  Interdetto,	  he	  foresaw	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Paci,	  1971.	  
42	  Moscarda,	  2002.	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detrimental	  influence	  of	  the	  Pope	  on	  the	  relationships	  among	  the	  ancient	  Italian	  States	  and	  
the	  emerging	  nations,	  and	  even	  proposed	  the	  State’s	  conversion	  to	  Protestantism.	  Was	  this	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